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Reporting on Risk:
How the Mass Media Portray Accidents,
Diseases, Disasters and Other Hazards
Eleanor Singer & Phyllis M. Endreny*
Introduction
Most of the information we have about risks comes to us by way of
the mass media. But it does not, for the most part, come as explicit
reporting about "risk." Instead, most reporting about hazards and their
associated risks comes in the guise of news and feature stories about
accidents, illnesses, natural disasters, and scientific breakthroughs.
Willy hilly, such reporting communicates risk information to media
audiences and to the family and friends with whom they discuss what
they have heard or read. Such information is communicated not only
by what is selected for coverage and what is not, but also by how it is
covered - where the story is placed, how much space or time is
devoted to it, whether it is accompanied by visuals or not. All this, of
course, is quite apart from whether or not explicit risk-related
information is included in the story, and if so, of what kind.
What is it, then, that the average reader or viewer would learn from
the way hazards and their associated risks are selected and presented by
the media?
For four months in 1984 we monitored fifteen media selected to
provide a sampling of national newspaper, newsmagazine, and television
coverage as well as some comparisons with local media, media aimed at
specialized audiences, and media dealing with specialized topics; a
subset of these were monitored for four weeks in 1960. During these
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two sampling periods, every story dealing with a hazard or a group of
hazards was selected for analysis, assigned to a specific hazard category
(e.g., natural hazards), and given a code number pertaining to a specific
hazard within that category (e.g., flood). From the total number of
stories identified in this fashion - 3,828 - we randomly selected a
smaller number (952 in 1984 and 323 in 1960) for detailed analysis.
For each of this smaller number of stories, we coded a set of media
variables - e.g., when and where it appeared, how long it was, and
whether it was accompanied by any graphics. For each, we also coded
the specific hazard; factual details in the story; kind of information
contained about risk; locus of blame or responsibility; the sources
quoted; the research (if any) cited; groups noted as being at risk; the
proportion of the story devoted to risks and to benefits, and so on.
Using the data collected in this fashion, we then addressed four
broad questions: What kind of hazards do the media report? What
kind of information do they present about them? Who is held
responsible for hazards and their prevention? How accurate is reporting
on hazards in the media? This article summarizes our findings.
What Kind of Hazards Do the Media Report?
We inferred three general principles governing the definition and
selection of hazards by the media. First, what is defined as a hazard
changes over time. For example, in 1960, most stories about nuclear
energy emphasized benefits rather than costs; by 1984, the proportions
had reversed. In the 196 0's, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on
Roe vs. Wade, stories about abortion emphasized the risks of illegal
abortions to the mother; in 1984, stories about abortion emphasized the
risks of legal abortions for the fetus.
Second, though the hazard definitions appearing in the mass media
may change, the media in all likelihood do not initiate the changes;
their definitions and selections of hazards for coverage are ordinarily
shaped by sources other than the media themselves. For example,
during our media-monitoring period, stories about the space shuttle
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were numerous but made no mention of associated risks at all; after the
Challenger exploded, this practice underwent significant change.
Third, a direct comparison between hazards as topics of news stories
and as causes of death shows essentially no relationship between the
two. However, the correlation between the number of stories about each
hazard in 1960 and in 1984 is substantial. Thus, what is newsworthy
did not change very much over a period of 24 years. But what is
newsworthy does not correspond very well with the distribution of
hazardous events in the real world, as measured by mortality figures.
Why not? Because, as it turns out, the media tend to feature what the
Statistical Abstract of the United States calls "catastrophic" accidents
- accidents in which five or more people are killed simultaneously.
Such accidents rank near or at the top in terms of media attention, even
though with one exception (automobile accidents) they do not result in
a large number of deaths per year. Thus, media definitions of risk are
based on the drama of the single hazardous event, not on the
cumulatively greater but less spectacular risks reflected in annual
mortality figures.
We formulated several hypotheses about the hazards that would be
attended to by the media. First, we predicted that stories about hazards
with associated deaths or injuries would be longer and more
prominently featured than other hazard stories. This hypothesis was
supported both in 1960 and in 1984. Second, we hypothesized that
stories about "new" hazards would be longer and featured more
prominently than other hazards. This hypothesis, too, was supported,
and this journalistic bias in favor of the new and the current may limit
coverage of chronic hazards such as illness, air or water pollution,
poverty, and hazardous working conditions, unless some dramatic
happening makes them suddenly "news."
Third, we predicted that the media would attend
disproportionately to hazards affecting the more affluent and powerful.
Admittedly, without knowing more about the number of hazards
affecting each group, it is difficult to say whether coverage is too much
or not enough. The evidence we were able to bring to bear on this
5 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 261 [Summer 1994]
hypothesis is mixed. Relatively few stories in either year, and fewer in
1960 than in 1984, mentioned such social categories as race, gender,
class, and age. But the majority of stories mentioning such categories
were about the less affluent and the less powerful: blacks, women, poor
people, and the elderly. Nevertheless, we concluded that the small
number of stories (3 in 1960 and 62 in 1984) dealing explicitly with
hazards of blacks, women, the elderly, or the poor is evidence of bias -
i.e., a disproportionate lack of attention'. However, those stories that do
deal explicitly with hazards affecting one or more of these groups were
longer, not shorter, than other stories. Fourth, we expected that various
specialized media would attend disproportionately to the hazards of
their particular audience (e.g., blacks, women), but we found no
evidence for this in the small sample of media we examined. However,
because of the small number of specialized media we looked at, and the
short sampling period, our evidence for this hypothesis is severely
limited.
Finally, we predicted that geographic location would affect the
amount of coverage, with hazard stories about countries "close" to the
U.S., geographically and culturally, receiving more coverage than
warranted, and countries geographically and culturally distant receiving
less. The evidence for this proposition is meager, however. News about
hazards in the U.S. is indeed given disproportionate attention in the
U.S. press; but there are no consistent biases in favor of other parts of
the world.
What Kind of Information
Do the Media Communicate about Risk?
So far, we have talked about principles of selection and definition.
But what kind of information is presented by the media about those
hazards they choose to feature?
As noted, the media generally do not report on hazards and
associated risks. They report on specific instances of a hazard (e.g. a
flood, a plane crash, the pollution of a town's water supply) that
produce or are accompanied by specific harms, i.e., so many dead, so
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many hurt and so many houses destroyed. From such scenarios we have
abstracted, for purposes of this research, concepts of hazard and risk,
benefit and cost, but journalism is not about these abstract concepts.
There is an inherent conflict between the business of news and what
social scientists and others call risk communication. To communicate
information about hazards and risks in a way calculated to foster
rational decision-making means providing detailed and precise
information about immediate and long-term consequences, to weigh
the costs and benefits of a hazard and its alternatives for the individual
and for society, and to discuss the issues, moral and economic, that
inhere in hazardous processes and events.
But reporting about hazards is ordinarily reporting about events
rather than issues, about immediate consequences rather than long-term
considerations, about harms (injury, property destruction, death) rather
than risks - i.e., the statistical probability of harm. Alternatives are
almost never considered in a story about a particular hazard, and when
they are considered, their risks and benefits are not. Moral or ethical
issues are generally absent from news stories about hazards, and even
economic issues are for the most part ignored.
If these omissions were errors on the part of journalists, there would
be reason for optimism. But for the most part, they are not. Nothing in
the rules of journalism says that the reporter must, in addition to
describing an industrial accident, also inform readers about the
likelihood of such an event occurring again, or about the risks posed by
the industry in general, or about alternatives and their benefits and
costs. "Enterprise" journalism might deal with any or all of these issues,
but enterprise journalism is likely to remain a minor part of the
journalistic enterprise. Nevertheless, according to laws spelled out by
Kahneman and Tversky, the media do communicate risk information.
They do it by the prominence and space accorded the account of a
hazard, but these indirect signals need not correspond to the actual
probability of its occurrence or the likelihood of its causing harm.
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How Accurate Is the Information Communicated?
A broad definition of accuracy might insist that, to be considered
accurate, news stories about a hazard should also be comprehensive:
should include details such as the likelihood of its occurrence; the
annual mortality associated with it; and whether or not alternatives to
the hazard are safer or less safe than the one under consideration. If this
were the standard of accuracy, most hazard reporting would have to be
accounted inaccurate. Instead, we adopted a much less stringent
standard, one against which we tested only a subset of all hazard stories.
We identified all those news or feature stories in our sample that
referred to a research report and cited a published source for that
report, and then systematically compared the two accounts. Many of
the discrepancies we observed in this comparison involve omissions of
qualifying statements and details of method. Other deviations involve
shifts in emphasis, less precise wordings, and more colloquial terms. But
two-fifths of the news stories we coded had one or more statements
that were substantially different from statements in the original research
report. For example, an NBC News story said that researchers "studied
133 men who suffered massive heart attacks while exercising." In fact,
only nine of the 133 had actually suffered a heart attack while
exercising. One report could not be located at all because the reference
in the news story was incorrect. Thus, in contrast to earlier research,
which had concluded that errors of omission are much more frequent
than errors of commission in the reporting of science news, our own
study suggests that errors of commission also occur in a substantial
number of cases.
Whether or not such omissions and alterations should be regarded
as inaccurate reporting depends on how we define accuracy. For
example, most existing information about risks is partial and
contingent. Beliefs about whether or not a particular substance poses a
hazard to humans, and how much of a hazard it poses, are based on
assumptions, research findings, statistical calculations and
extrapolations. If mass media accounts do not reflect limitations in the
data or the research methods used, and if conflicting findings are
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presented without interpretation or evaluation, then flaws exist in the
communication process, whether we call these flaws "inaccuracies" or
give them some other name.
What is particularly troubling is the suggestion, in our findings, that
omissions and alterations are more likely in bylined stories than in
anonymous ones. It is troubling because it underlines the existence of
different standards for journalists and scientists, not simply carelessness
on the part of reporters protected by anonymity. Yet, the fact that the
wire service stories contained the fewest substantively different
statements is cause for comfort, since these stories are distributed more
widely than those by bylined journalists, even when syndicated.
Science in the popular press is livelier and easier to read than science
in the scholarly journals. It is also simpler, sharper, and less ambiguous
than science in those journals; and science in the scholarly journals is
already simpler, sharper, and much less messy than the science that
takes place in the laboratory or in the field. Without a great deal of
additional research, we cannot know the consequences of such
simplification. But we can speculate that science and scientists come
across as more authoritative than they really are, and that scientific
findings elicit more confidence than may be warranted.
But the question of accuracy, as we have posed it, is only the tip of
the iceberg. Much more frequent than a news report on an isolated
study is the incorporation of many different research findings into a
news story about a particular hazard - e.g., radon. In that situation,
reporters must present not the results of one study but the conclusions
of a number of scientists working in a given area. And the fact is that
scientists often disagree, from whether or not the "big bang" theory can
explain the origin of the universe, to whether or not electromagnetic
fields are capable of causing cancer, to how much of a threat radon in
homes really is. Under these circumstances, what does accurate
reporting consist in?
The practice of "objective" journalism consists in presenting both
(or more than two) divergent points of view on an issue. Whether that is
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"accurate" reporting or not depends on whether the different positions
are equally compelling, or whether instead the weight of evidence
clearly favors one side. Unfortunately, this is information the reader or
viewer is rarely made privy to.
The even-handed model of reporting on political opinions or issue
positions is not necessarily good for reporting on risk. The reader or
viewer needs a knowledgeable appraisal of the evidence: Which, if any,
side does it favor? Is it too early to tell? When is better evidence likely
to become available?
Sometimes, of course, the positions are political rather than
scientific, or at least a mixture of the two. In that case, we might ask
"accurate" reporting to separate the two components, and clarify for
mass media audiences to what extent the conflict is about the factual
implications of evidence, and to what extent it is about their economic
or political or ethical implications, instead.
Who Is Held Accountable for the Hazard?
We distinguished two kinds of accountability: blame for the
occurrence of a hazard and responsibility for its prevention. Media
attributions of accountability were much more frequent in the second,
preventive sense than in the first. Further, those agents responsible for
preventive action were not necessarily the same as those blamed for its
occurrence.
At least half of the stories we analyzed made no attributions of
blame at all, either because responsibility was taken for granted or
because the issue of blame did not arise. For example, stories about
natural hazards were particularly unlikely to include explicit attributions
of blame. We noted no differences in this tendency either over time or
between media.
Blame for the occurrence of a hazard varied according to the type
of hazard involved. Victims, for example, tended to be held
accountable in the case of activities that could be construed as
voluntary, but not in the case of other hazards. (Where blame was
assigned at all, they were also held accountable for illness, but relatively
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few illness stories assigned such a responsibility.) In a sense, then, the
interesting question is how some activities come to be construed as
voluntary, others as involuntary. The ongoing debate about whether or
not alcoholism is an illness, and the extent to which heredity is
responsible for its expression, is a case in point.
Recent interest in public responses to radon has turned up an
apparently paradoxical finding: risks tend to be perceived as more
serious when there is someone to blame. Radon from natural deposits
of radioactive rock tends to be ignored by the public, whereas radon
resulting from industrial waste disposal has led to organized public
demands for cleaning up the offending source. It is unclear to what
extent the media would or could counteract this tendency, which from
the point of view of scientists assessing the relative risks of the two
sources is misplaced.
We found no differences between media in their targeting of
blame. But because reporting on risk is event-centered, all the media in
our study tended to make what Fischhoff has called the fundamental
attribution error: the tendency to attribute too much responsibility to
individual actors, including individual corporations, and too little to the
social and environmental constraints within which they act.
Turnabout on Attitudes Toward Risk?
We could find no evidence of increasing aversion to risk on the part
of the media between 1960 and 1984. On the contrary, we found some
very slight tendency in the reverse direction. Hazard stories in 1984
gave somewhat more attention to benefits than they had in 1960, and
they were also somewhat more likely to include a discussion of
alternatives to the hazard and to reject the alternative in favor of the
hazard itself. These are all small shifts, to be sure, and may involve
reporting on different hazards rather than a changing view of specific
hazards. Still, they may be indicative of a subtle change in the social
climate pertaining to the acceptance of risk.
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The 1980's in the U.S., beginning with the presidency of Ronald
Reagan and continuing with that of George Bush, came to symbolize
the retrenchment of government in favor of increasingly unregulated
private activity - a development spurred, perhaps, by decades of
increasing regulation and government expansion. At the same time, the
economic situation of the country consistently declined. Increasing
media emphasis on the benefits of risky activities instead of their costs,
and on the considerable costs of reducing these risks, may well reflect
both of these social trends. And, although the Clinton presidency is
more hospitable to a government role in economic activity than its
predecessors, it seems to be equally concerned about the mounting
costs associated with government programs, including those involved in
risk reduction. Thus, institutional forces pushing toward a reappraisal of
how much risk society is willing to tolerate are likely to continue in the
foreseeable future.
